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INTRODUCTION 
hina is probably the largest and fastest-growing market for blog 
and other social media services. According to an official report 
released by the China Internet Network Information Center, as of the 
end of June 2012, the number of blogs in China had reached more 
than 353 million and about 65.7% of Chinese Internet users had their 
own blogs.1 In recent years, a vast number of Chinese Internet users 
have also shown strong interest in maintaining their own microblog, 
or weibo, which is the Chinese version of Twitter.2 More than 273 
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1 Zhongguo Hulian Wangluo Xinxi Zhongxin (中国互联网络信息中心) [CHINA 
INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR.], Zhongguo Hulian Wanglou Fazhan Zhuangkuang 
Tongji Baogao (中国互联网络发展状况统计报告) [STATISTICAL REPORT ON INTERNET 
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA] 25, 31 (July 2012), http://www.cnnic.cn/research/bgxz/tjbg 
/201207/P020120719489935146937.pdf. 
2 Like Facebook and YouTube, Twitter is a western social media service blocked in 
China. By contrast, the microblog (weibo) services are specially tailored for the Chinese 
C
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million microblogs have been launched in China, which means that 
about 50.9% of China’s Internet users have been involved in 
microblogging activities.3 Numerous Chinese celebrities, such as 
actors and singers, have their own blogs or microblogs.4 
At the same time, China’s regulations and other controls that target 
blogging and microblogging activities are drawing as much attention 
around the world as the number of its rapidly growing blogs and 
microblogs. More than sixty government regulations, enforced at both 
the national and local levels, regulate online content.5 These 
regulations include the Measures for Managing Internet Information 
Services (2000 Measures), Provisions for the Administration of 
Electronic Bulletin Board System Services (BBS Provisions), the 
 
market’s censorship requirements. Domestic microblog service providers include Baidu, 
Netease, Tencent, People’s Daily, Sina, and Sohu. Among others, Sina Weibo is dominant 
and continuously growing in the Chinese microblog market. See, e.g., BILL DODSON, 
CHINA FAST FORWARD: THE TECHNOLOGIES, GREEN INDUSTRIES AND INNOVATIONS 
DRIVING THE MAINLAND’S FUTURE xvi (2012) (“With Twitter blocked in China, Weibo 
has become the default microblogger of choice for hundreds of millions of Internet users 
in the country.”); Jonathan Sullivan, A Tale of Two Microblogs in China, 34 MEDIA, 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 773, 773 (2012) (“[T]he leading Chinese microblog service, Sina 
Weibo, had around 150 million users in August 2011 and is growing at a rate of almost 10 
million per month.”) (citation omitted); Chinese Internet Companies: An Internet with 
Chinese Characteristics, ECONOMIST, July 30, 2011, at 71, 71, available at http://www 
.economist.com/node/21524821 (“A recent addition to this innovative group is Sina 
Weibo. Run by Sina, another leading internet firm, it is often billed as the ‘Twitter of 
China.’”); Gady Epstein, Sina Weibo, FORBES ASIA, (Mar. 3, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www 
.forbes.com/global/2011/0314/features-charles-chao-twitter-fanfou-china-sina-weibo.html 
(Charles Chao, with a new Chinese version of Twitter, Sina Weibo, gambled on a 
politically sensitive Internet service. “So far his move is paying off.”); Owen Fletcher, 
Sina’s Weibo Shows Strong User Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2011, 5:03 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576515290822467846.html 
(“China’s Sina Corp said the number of accounts for its Twitter-like Weibo service 
jumped about 40% in three months to more than 200 million users . . . .”); Jeffrey Hays, 
Weibos, China’s Twitter-Like Microblogs: Their Power, Popularity, Speed and Ability to 
Avoid Censors, FACTS AND DETAILS (2008), http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid 
=1840&catid=7&subcatid=44 (last updated March 2012) (“China’s Twitter-like 
microblogs are called weibos. . . . China’s two major Twitter-like microblogs Sina and 
Tencent have more than 200 million registered users each.”). 
3 CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFO. CTR., supra note 1, at 25. 
4 See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 776 (stating that the most popular Weibo users are 
actresses and TV personalities); Shaojung Sharon Wang & Junhao Hong, Discourse 
Behind the Forbidden Realm: Internet Surveillance and its Implications on China’s 
Blogosphere, 27 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 67, 71 (2010) (2006 and 2007 surveys 
showed audiences frequently visited actors’, actresses’, or other celebrities’ blogs). 
5 OPENNET INITIATIVE, ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS AND 
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 456–60 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010); Trina K. Kissel, License 
to Blog: Internet Regulation in the People’s Republic of China, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 229, 233–34 (2007). 
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State Secrets Protection Regulations for Computer Information 
Systems on the Internet, etc.6 Furthermore, the Chinese government 
has employed quite rigorous technical controls over online 
information flows, and these controls significantly affect blogging 
and relevant online activities.7 Multiple stakeholders, such as Internet 
users, Internet service providers (ISPs), and Internet content providers 
(ICPs), are all accountable for illegal online content in China.8 
Because Chinese bloggers and microbloggers publish their 
opinions under the government’s scrutiny, an interesting issue is 
whether or not these social media have influenced Chinese people’s 
perceptions and conceptions of human rights. Blogging and 
microblogging activities require user involvement, communications, 
connection, and sharing. Such social interaction may lead to the 
establishment of new social issues and substantial changes in values 
and ideas. In the blogosphere, where politics are not concerned, 
bloggers, microbloggers, and the Chinese courts have begun to define 
the scope of free speech.9 Therefore, social media’s impact on 
China’s politics and human rights—especially free speech and 
privacy—may be a gradual and subtle evolution, rather than a 
democratic revolution.10 
From the perspectives of Chinese bloggers, the political control of 
online expression, such as censorship, is actually a tradeoff for free 
speech outside the political domain.11 In this essay, I will first analyze 
how the Chinese government controls political blogging and 
microblogging activities. Then I will examine a recent Chinese 
defamation case, Beijing Kingsoft Security Software Co., Ltd. v. Zhou, 
in which Chinese courts first explored the social role of 
 
6 E.g., Kissel, supra note 5, at 235–36. 
7 Ashley Esarey & Xiao Qiang, Political Expression in the Chinese Blogosphere: 
Below the Radar, 48 ASIAN SURV. 752, 754–55 (2008) (“It is well known that numerous 
government agencies . . . participate in management of the Internet; the State employs tens 
of thousands of vigilant ‘Internet Police’ . . . .”); Jyh-An Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden 
City Enclosed by the Great Firewall: The Law and Power of Internet Filtering in China, 
13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 125, 129–35 (2012); Guobin Yang, A Chinese Internet? 
History, Practice, and Globalization, 5 CHINESE J. COMM. 49, 52–53 (2012). 
8 Kissel, supra note 5, at 236–37; Lee & Liu, supra note 7, at 149–50. 
9 See infra Part III (discussion of Kingsoft I and Kingsoft II). 
10 Rebecca MacKinnon, Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civil 
Discourse in China, 134 PUB. CHOICE 31, 44–45 (2008). 
11 Id. at 42; see also Sullivan, supra note 2, at 776 (“For the majority of users, however, 
it seems that ‘censorship and other forms of manipulation [are seen] as a necessary trade-
off required to obtain the right to interact online.’”) (alteration in original). 
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microblogging and its relations with free speech.12 The Chinese case 
exhibits some controversies similar to the recent U.S. online 
defamation case, Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox,13 which was 
decided by an Oregon federal district court around the same time. 
From the Chinese court decision, we can, to some extent, understand 
that vigorous social media activities have gradually influenced the 
human rights practices in China in a positive way. 
I 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF BLOGGING 
The Chinese government both employs blogs as a tool to shape 
public opinion and, at the same time, stringently regulates citizens’ 
blogging activities. It is reported that an army of government-trained 
online commentators writes blogs in support of the Chinese state and 
its various stances.14 Since 2005, in order to enable a “system for 
monitoring sites in real time,” the government has mandated that all 
non-commercial websites, including blogs, be registered, and that the 
sites’ developers or owners provide their identities.15 Bloggers may 
find their websites inaccessible if they fail to register.16 At the same 
time, for blogs found to serve as a tool for collective political protest, 
owners who do register may bear criminal liability for the blogs’ 
content.17 
Another effective government control over blogging is the 
imposition of filtering and censorship obligations on blog service 
 
12 Beijing Jinshan Anquan Ruanjian Youxian Gongsi Su Zhou Hongyi (北京金山安全
软件有限公司诉周鸿祎) [Beijing Kingsoft Security Software Co. v. Zhou] (Kingsoft II), 
No. 09328 (The First Intermediary People’s Court 2011) (China). 
13 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334 (D. Or. Nov. 
30, 2011). 
14 Kissel, supra note 5, at 232. 
15 Reporters Without Borders, Authorities Declare War on Unregistered Websites and 
Blogs (June 6, 2005), http://ar.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=14010; see also MacKinnon, 
supra note 10, at 37. 
16 MacKinnon, supra note 10, at 37. In China, when the government shuts down a blog, 
bloggers euphemistically describe it as being “harmonized”; however, a blogger can 
always open a new blog elsewhere. E.g., Nicholas Bequelin, Crackdown in China, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/opinion/08iht-edbequelin08 
.html. 
17 See Charles Hutzler, Wang Lihong, Chinese Online Activist, Sentenced to Prison for 
Staging Protest, HUFF POST WORLD (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/09/09/wang-lihong-prison_n_955226.html (reporting that “[an] online activist 
[in China] was sentenced to nine months in jail . . . for staging a protest [on his blog]”). 
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providers.18 In 2005, Microsoft was found to have censored its 
Chinese users’ blog content at the behest of the Chinese 
government,19 removing words like “democracy” and “human 
rights.”20 Submitting again to official Chinese pressure, Microsoft 
later closed the website of Zhao Jing (pseudonym Michael Anti), one 
of the most famous bloggers in China.21 Zhao Jing’s story eventually 
led to Congressional hearings in the United States regarding these 
matters.22 Microsoft’s intervention in blogging activities was 
criticized by some commentators as simply unnecessary because 
servers hosting the blogs were actually in the United States, not 
China.23 
Another instance of censorship was the government shutdown of 
the blog platform bullog.cn (Niubo) on January 9, 2009, for “picking 
up harmful information on political and current affairs.”24 Blogbus 
and BlogCN are other popular blogs that were temporarily blocked by 
the Chinese government in its attempt to “‘clean’ them and make 
them politically correct.”25 In specific cases, blog service providers 
have handed users’ personal information over to the government upon 
its request to avoid possible fines or revocation of business licenses.26 
Owing to the government’s strict control of online political speech, 
 
18 Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas are Watching: China’s Censorship of the Internet 
and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 587–88 (2007); 
MacKinnon, supra note 10, at 38. 
19 AMNESTY INT’L, UNDERMINING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF 
YAHOO!, MICROSOFT AND GOOGLE 19–20 (July 2006), http://www.google.com/url?sa 
=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.ethicsworld.org%2Fcorporatesocialresponsibility%2FPDF%2520links%2Famnesty 
.pdf&ei=Q61_UPPCHZDMigLvg4CoCw&usg=AFQjCNEEJuZQFczMyK743VwkPP43i
1Ltyw&sig2=yEQ1zSYnQQDDgK-74a2nXw. 
20 YONGNIAN ZHENG, TECHNOLOGICAL EMPOWERMENT: THE INTERNET, STATE, AND 
SOCIETY IN CHINA 66 (2008). 
21 Id. 
22 The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression? Before the Subcomm. on 
Africa, Global Human Rights, and Int’1 Operations and the Subcomm. on Asia and the 
Pacific and the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 3 (2006). 
23 See Surya Deva, Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares 
for the Global Compact or the Global Online Freedom Act?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 255, 269–70 (2007). 
24 See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at 456–57 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
25 Wang & Hong, supra note 4, at 69. 
26 MacKinnon, supra note 10, at 37. 
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Chinese bloggers have learned to avoid publishing politically 
sensitive content27 or to publish it in disguised or indirect ways.28 
II 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MICROBLOGGING 
Microblogging, or weibo, is subject to primarily the same 
regulations as blogging in China. Microblogs are easier to use than 
blogs when it comes to the dissemination of information, including 
personal opinion. Because microblogging posts are relatively short,29 
microbloggers can always express their opinions easily and 
immediately via smartphones or other electronic devices. Microblogs 
have thus swiftly become a primary tool with which Chinese people 
express their thoughts to relatives, friends, or the world. 
The prevalence and power of microblogs can be illustrated by the 
story of Wang Gongquan, a famous investor in China and a user of 
Sina Weibo. His microblog announcement that he had left his wife for 
his mistress was republished throughout China sixty thousand times 
within twenty-four hours.30 Microblogs, however, are not just for 
personal or tabloid communications, as the popular and effective tool 
has facilitated Chinese people’s coordination of large-scale 
campaigns (so long as they remain outside the political sphere).31 
Like blog service providers, microblog service providers must, by 
law, guarantee that flows of information are under control through the 
 
27 See Wang & Hong, supra note 4, at 75 (“[I]f blogging is replete with the character of 
celebrity gossip, personal experience, and self-disclosure, the abundant diary-style blogs 
and the bloggers’ limited interest in politics demonstrate a new cultural phenomenon that 
obscures the impact of Internet censorship in China’s blogosphere.”); see also Sullivan, 
supra note 2, at 776 (stating that the use of Sina Weibo “is dominated by entertainment”). 
28 Lee & Liu, supra note 7, at 147–48; see also DODSON, supra note 2, at 24 (to avoid 
being censored, Chinese microbloggers “used the ancient Chinese character for river—
jiang—to represent [Jiang Zemin’s] surname, though the character they used was different 
from that of the surname”); Xiao Qiang, The Battle for the Chinese Internet, 22 J. 
DEMOCRACY 47, 52–53 (2011) (introducing a number of homophonies that Chinese 
netizens have used to avoid censorship). 
29 Like Twitter, each microblog post cannot exceed 140 characters. See, e.g., DODSON, 
supra note 2, at 24. However, the Chinese microblog Sina Weibo provides functions that 
Twitter lacks; namely, Sina Weibo permits users to circulate images, including videos, and 
to attach them to text messages. E.g., Guobin Yang, A Chinese Internet? History, Practice, 
and Globalization, 5 CHINESE J. COMM. 49, 50 (2012). 
30 MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN ET AL., THE $10 TRILLION DOLLAR PRIZE: CAPTIVATING 
THE NEWLY AFFLUENT IN CHINA AND INDIA 179 (2012). 
31 Yang, supra note 29, at 50. 
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providers’ own implementation of censorship techniques.32 The 
Chinese government has justified this requirement by declaring that 
unregulated microblogging has led to the circulation of false rumors 
and other harmful speech with such untoward consequences as 
Urumqi’s 2009 ethnic riots, which resulted in nearly two hundred 
deaths.33 Using the same reasoning, the Chinese government has 
blocked Twitter from operations in China since July of 2009.34 Local 
microblogging service providers will not be able to renew their 
license if they do not fulfill their censorship obligations.35 
In order to provide a high level of censorship, microblog service 
providers, such as Sina Weibo, need to use groups of human censors 
in addition to sophisticated censorship software.36 In December 2010, 
Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times started microblogging with 
Sina Weibo to test its level of censorship.37 His post regarding 
Tiananmen Square was deleted by the moderators within twenty 
minutes.38 Kristof’s microblog was eventually shut down after 
receiving wide attention from the media.39 
Another important aspect of censorship in this area is that the 
government as well as microblog service providers regulate the search 
function accompanying Chinese microblogs.40 If a search on a 
microblog site contains politically sensitive keywords, such as “Falun 
Gong,” the name of the outlawed spiritual organization, the microblog 
site will respond to the search by presenting a webpage declaring that, 
pursuant to “‘relevant laws, regulations and policies, the search 
results have not been shown.’”41 Since March 2012, the government 
has further required microblog service providers to implement real-
 
32 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 776. For example, in order to avoid being used as a tool for 
mobilization, Sina Weibo closed its search function during some critical events, such as 
the awarding of the Nobel Prize to dissident Liu Xiobo. Yang, supra note 29, at 50. 
33 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 775. 
34 Qiang, supra note 28, at 51; see also Epstein, supra note 2. 
35 Brook Larmer, Where an Internet Joke Is Not Just a Joke, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 
26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/the-dangerous-politics-of           
-internet-humor-in-china.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all. 
36 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 776. Sina maintains more than one hundred employees to 
monitor the content twenty-four hours a day. Epstein, supra note 2. 
37 Nicholas D. Kristof, Banned in Beijing!, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES, Jan. 23, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/opinion/23kristof.html. 
38 Id. 
39 Nicholas D. Kristof, Blogs Interrupted, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES, Jan. 22, 2011,  
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/blogs-interrupted/. 
40 Epstein, supra note 2. 
41 Id. 
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name registration systems for all microblog users so that it can control 
microblogging activities more easily.42 
III 
FREE SPEECH IN THE BLOGOSPHERE 
Although blogging and microblogging are extensively regulated in 
China, they still change the way that information flows and people 
communicate with the aid of digital technology. Different from 
mainstream media artifacts, which are subject to strict ex ante 
editorial checks and reviews, blog and microblog content is 
immediately available to the public once it is written. Even politically 
sensitive content may be instantly forwarded or available to thousands 
of users before it can be censored. Such real-time features of social 
media serve as a catalyst for free speech. This may explain why 
blogging and microblogging have been frequently associated with 
free speech in China.43 In the blogosphere outside political speech,44 
Chinese netizens and courts have begun to treat free speech seriously 
as a fundamental human right protected by the Chinese 
Constitution.45 
Among all the discussions on digital free speech in China, the most 
salient ones are those relating to defamation. Chinese courts 
constantly deal with the boundaries delineating microbloggers’ right 
of free speech from others’ right to privacy and to freedom from 
 
42 Kathrin Hille, Real Name Rule to Add to Sina Weibo’s Woes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e995b7aa-6201-11e1-807f-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz27FVkOxM4. 
43 See Chinese Microblog Must Not Sacrifice Free Speech, WANT CHINA TIMES, July 
1, 2012, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news–subclass–cnt.aspx?id=20120701000080 
&cid=1701&MainCatID=17 (claiming that microblogging activities have brought about a 
certain degree of free speech in China); Keith B. Richburg, In China, Microblogging Sites 
Become Free–Speech Platform, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/world/in–china–microblogging–sites–become–free–speech–platform/2011/03/22 
/AfcsxlkB_story.html (stating that microblogging websites have become platforms for free 
speech in China). 
44 But see Zheng Yongnian et al., China’s Politics: Preparing for Leadership 
Reshuffling and Maintaining Status Quo, 4 E. ASIA POL’Y 5, 6 (2012) (“Chinese citizens 
today are no longer apolitical or passive; their deft usage of social networking sites like 
Weibo (or mini-blogs, Chinese equivalent to Twitter) to challenge China’s political 
establishment is testimonial that China has entered a new age.”). 
45 XIANFA art. 35 (1982) (China) (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy 
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of 
demonstration.”); Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
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defamation.46 The recent Chinese court decision Beijing Kingsoft 
Security Software Co. Ltd. v. Zhou, concerning microblogging 
defamation, involves several policy considerations similar to those 
involved in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, decided by the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.47 In the Kingsoft I case, 
defendant Hongyi Zhou, the Chairman of Qihoo Corporation, 
published postings on a number of microblogs on May 25, 2010, that 
criticized the corporation’s competitor, Kingsoft, as “touji mogou” 
(acting slyly and clandestinely), “gau yinmou” (plotting conspiracies), 
and “jiedao sharen” (killing people with a borrowed knife).48 He also 
referred to Kingsoft as “heishan” (black mountain), strongly implying 
that the company was a dishonest one.49 The next day, Kingsoft’s 
market value fell about six hundred million Hong Kong dollars 
(HKD) according to its stock prices in Hong Kong.50 
Kingsoft then sued Zhou for defamation and asked for 1.2 million 
renminbi (RMB) in damages in the Haidian People’s Court of 
Beijing.51 In March 2011, the district court ruled against Zhou, 
ordering him to delete the postings, apologize, and pay eighty 
thousand RMB to the plaintiff.52 Zhou then appealed to the First 
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing, the final court of appeal.53 On 
August 25, 2011, the First Intermediate People’s Court maintained the 
district court’s decision, but decreased the damages to fifty thousand 
RMB and ordered Zhou to delete two, instead of twenty, microblog 
postings.54 
 
46 See, e.g., Chinese Professor Wins Defamation Suit Against Blogging Web Site, POST–
GAZETTE.COM (Aug. 13, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business 
/technology/chinese-professor-wins-defamation-suit-against-blogging-web-site-445984 
/#ixzz273z4u1mg (reporting that “[a] Chinese journalism professor has won a lawsuit 
against a blog hosting site that refused to remove remarks criticizing him by one of its 
users”). 
47 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *1 (D. 
Or. Nov. 30, 2011) (drawing the line between defamation and free speech); Beijing 
Jinshan Anquan Ruanjian Youxian Gongsi Su Zhou Hongyi (北京金山安全软件有限公
司诉周鸿祎) [Beijing Kingsoft Security Software Co. v. Zhou Hongyi] (Kingsoft I), No. 
19075 (Haidian People’s Court 2011) (China) (reasoning that there should be a reasonable 
limitation on the right of free speech in microblogging activities). 
48 Kingsoft I, No. 19075. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
54 Id. 
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Kingsoft is a milestone case in China because it is the first one 
where the courts investigated the social role of microblogging in the 
context of free speech.55 Like the defendant in Obsidian Finance, 
Zhou claimed that blogs are a type of media that should, under the 
law, enjoy a wide scope of free speech.56 Whereas the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Oregon did not agree that an investigative 
blogger constitutes “media,”57 the Haidian People’s Court of Beijing 
stated that microblogs exhibit characteristics strongly indicative of 
“self-media,” which means that microblogs can influence unspecified 
and wide-ranging audiences.58 
Nonetheless, this decision made by the Chinese court does not 
mean that microbloggers are free to express any idea whatsoever on a 
microblog. The district court instead pointed out that there should be a 
reasonable limit on microblog free speech, and that this limit should 
concern the status of the given microblogger, the content of the 
corresponding post, relevant circumstances of the expressions therein, 
and the harm and other consequences caused by the post.59 In the 
second instance, the First Intermediate People’s Court further 
articulated the roles of microblogs, particularly in relation to free 
speech: 
Microblogs are a space for free expression. Citizens can express 
their thoughts about people or matters via short messages from an 
individual perspective. Microblogs provide a platform for free 
speech protected by our Constitution. Microblog speech is 
occasionally casual, subjective, or even astonishing. Nonetheless, 
criticism appearing on microblogs can usually function as the 
public’s own checks and balances to powerful interests. Because 
microblogs have important implications for enriching citizens’ 
spiritual life, each netizen should protect microblogs and avoid 
using them to attack other people. Otherwise, everyone is at risk of 
suffering undue harm stemming from other people’s microblog 
posts.60 
In addition to the issue of blogs or microblogs as a type of media, 
both Obsidian Finance and Kingsoft addressed the issue of “public 
concern.”61 Nonetheless, the U.S. and Chinese courts focused on 
 
55 Kingsoft I, No. 19075; Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
56 Kingsoft I, No. 19075. 
57 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5 (D. 
Or. Nov. 30, 2011). 
58 See Kingsoft I, No. 19075. 
59 Id. 
60 Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
61 Obsidian, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5–6; Kingsoft I, No. 19075; Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
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different parts of “public concern.”62 The Oregon district court 
carefully examined whether defendants’ statements regarding 
plaintiffs constituted a matter of “public concern.”63 Under the 
Obsidian Finance precedent, when the subject of speech is a matter of 
public concern, defendants may enjoy a wider range of free speech 
than would otherwise be the case.64 The Chinese courts in Kingsoft 
approached “public concern” in a quite different way.65 Although 
Kingsoft is a publicly listed company in Hong Kong, the Chinese 
courts did not consider investors’ right of knowing and discussing the 
companies’ corporate affairs as well as other similar “public 
concerns.” Instead, both the Haidian People’s Court of Beijing and 
the First Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing indicated that 
defendant’s public persona, rather than the content of the speech, was 
of great importance in deciding the case.66 The district court reasoned 
that “as a public figure, Zhou has a great number of fans and a 
powerful voice; therefore, he is supposed to resume more 
responsibility and to be more aware of the consequences resulting 
from his microblogging.”67 The First Intermediate People’s Court of 
Beijing similarly ruled that, “as a public figure, Zhou should be more 
cautious of his behavior because he knows more about the wide scope 
and the high speed of Internet communications.”68 
In the United States, if a plaintiff is a public figure, he or she 
cannot claim defamation stemming from incorrect harmful statements 
unless there is proof that the writer or publisher acted with actual 
malice.69 Whether the defendant is a public figure may not make any 
difference. In contrast, Chinese courts weighed considerably the fact 
that the defendant Zhou was a public figure and expected him both to 
bear a higher standard of care and to set an example for Chinese 
netizens.70 This difference strongly suggests that Chinese law 
 
62 Kingsoft I, No. 19075 (stating that the court should carefully examine whether 
defendant’s liability can be exempted because of public-interest concerns); Kingsoft II, No. 
09328 (similarly suggested that public-interest concerns should be taken into consideration 
in deciding defendant’s liability and right of free speech). 
63 Obsidian, 2011 WL 5999334, at *6. 
64 Id. at *5–6. 
65 See Kingsoft I, No. 19075; Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
66 See Kingsoft I, No. 19075; Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
67 Kingsoft I, No. 19075; Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
68 Kingsoft II, No. 09328. 
69 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1963). 
70 Kingsoft I, No. 19075. 
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comprises more moral components and has higher expectations of 
public figures than U.S. law. 
CONCLUSION 
Blogging and microblogging represent the largest and most 
dynamic communication platforms on the Chinese Internet. While it 
is not easy to evaluate whether blogging and microblogging will bring 
about regime change, it is obvious that social media has been serving 
as a catalyst for social change in the country. In this sense, the Nobel 
Laureate Liu Xiobo is certainly right in stating that the Internet is 
“‘God’s gift to China.’”71 
Although China’s blogging and microblogging activities portray a 
lack of robust political expression, they have pushed Chinese courts 
and netizens to recognize the value of free speech. In cases where the 
disputed speech is not politically sensitive, the Chinese courts have 
begun to develop a more sophisticated theory of free speech, taking 
into account the free flow of information, individuals’ reputation and 
privacy, the nature of social media and its social effects, and so on. 
Although Chinese courts’ approaches to these issues differ from the 
approaches common in the United States and other democratic 
regimes, the continuous attention that Chinese courts have paid to 
free-speech issues may eventually promote relevant human-rights 
practices in the country. Digital technologies, thus, have the potential 
to stimulate democracy in China steadily, indirectly, and in 
unintended ways. 
 
 
71 Andrew Jacobs & Jonathan Ansfield, Nobel Peace Prize Given to Jailed Chinese 
Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/world/09nobel 
.html?pagewanted=all. 
